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Pay Television Legal Protections
Against Interception: Backyard
Earth Stations Amplify Current
Imperfections
I. Introduction
"The Commission is literally sitting on a 'time bomb.' ""
This warning is genuine. The Federal Communications Com-
mission (FCC or Commission) has failed to develop an adequate
policy addressing the problem created when an unintended receiver
intercepts and converts to private use pay television2 programming
sent through the public airwaves. The prevailing legal framework
compounds the problem by unsuitably defining the legal protection
afforded pay television programming against these intrusions. Nev-
ertheless, the problem continues to mount as the growth of techno-
logical capabilities in the communications field accelerates. Thus,
I. In the matter of Part 90 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations, 86 F.C.C.2d
405, 409 (1981) (statement of Commissioner Joseph R. Fogarty).
2. This comment will focus on pay television rather than conventional broadcasting.
The sources of revenue distinguish these two services. Advertisers fund conventional broad-
casting while viewer charges fund pay television. Pay television, therefore, enables program-
ming aimed at specific viewer preferences. An FCC Staff Report explains:
Because the advertisers want to reach as large an audience as possible and are
willing to pay more for larger audiences, station operators have an incentive to try to
find programs that large numbers of consumers want more than alternative pro-
grams. But they have no incentive to try to satisfy intense preferences of relatively
small audiences. Devotees of opera or chess tournaments, who might be willing to
pay large amounts to see these events televised, will probably not be served by adver-
tiser-supported broadcasters. Pay programming will offer small groups with strong
tastes the possibility of buying the programming they want.
STAFF REPORT ON POLICIES FOR REGULATION OF DIRECT BROADCAST SATELLITES 14, Fed-
eral Communications Commission, Office of Plans and Policy (October 2, 1980) [hereinafter
cited as FCC STAFF REPORT]. For more information on the economic considerations of ad-
vertiser-supported broadcasting versus pay television, see Posner, The Appropriate Scope of
Regulation in the Cable Television Industry, 3 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCL 98, 103 (1972);
Shapiro, Epstein & Cass, Cable-Satellite Networks.- Structures and Problems, 24 CATH. U. L.
REV. 692, 692 n.2 (1975); Telser, Supply and Demandfor Advertising Messages, 56 AM. ECON.
REV. 457, 459 (1966); Comment, Regulation ofPay-Cable and Closed Circuit Movies: No Room
in the Wasteland, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 600, 610-11 (1973). For a general review of pay televi-
sion, see Rappaport, The Emergence of Subscription Cable Television and Its Role in Communi-
cations, 29 FED. COM. B.J. 301 (1976).
3. Congress may regulate the airwaves through a proper exercise of the commerce
power. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943). However, any regu-
lation of the airwaves must be in the public interest. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151, 303 (1976).
the Commission finds itself in a precarious position4 to answer the
essential question: What can pay television suppliers do about pro-
gram pirates?5
II. An Overview
The use of new technologies including, most significantly, the
man-made satellite has revolutionized telecommunications.6 Addi-
4. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is the administrative agency au-
thorized by the Communications Act of 1934 to regulate development of the communications
industry. See infra note 75 and accompanying text. Because any FCC regulation must pro-
mote the public interest, the FCC originally justified regulation of cable and pay television as
necessary for the protection of local broadcasters. See infra note 19. The FCC, however, may
regulate cable only as reasonably ancillary to its broadcast television jurisdiction. See Note,
Pay Television: The Pendulum Swings Toward Deregulation, 18 WASHBURN L.J. 86, 88 (1978);
see also United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649 (1972); United States v. South-
western Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968); Home Box Office, Inc. v. Federal Communications
Commission, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977). In recent years, the courts have led a trend toward
deregulation of cable television. The courts have utilized two grounds to invalidate FCC regu-
lations. First, courts have held that overbroad regulations that further no substantial govern-
ment interest violate the first amendment. Note, Pay Television, supra. Second, regulations
without legitimate objectives may be invalidated on grounds of insufficient justification. Id;
see also 567 F.2d at 48. Following this lead, the FCC voluntarily deregulated some areas, see,
e.g., Regulation of Domestic Receive-Only Satellite Earth Stations, 74 F.C.C.2d 205 (1979),
and a recent congressional bill suggests total pay cable deregulation. H.R. 13015, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess., 124 CONG. REC. 5231 (1978) (proposed Communications Act of 1978 omitted cable
from FCC jurisdiction). This recent uncertainty regarding the extent of FCC regulatory power
may explain the Commission's reluctance to take a firm stand on the problem of pay television
interception.
5. The term "pirate" is not simply a product of pay television industry scorn. Some
manufacturers of reception devices choose this label. One trade publication notes: "Pirate
TV. Bootleg TV Systems. Hijack TV. Bandito Satellite Systems. Those are just a few of the
names chosen by a growing number of companies engaged in the thriving new business of
supplying electronic hardware for pirating cable and subscription TV signals." The Lewis
Letter 1, August, 1980. Of course, the term "pirate" often disparages the business as well. The
Lewis Letter continues: "Not since the Jolly Roger flew from the mainmasts of maurauding
privateers has thievery been flaunted so openly." Id
6. The type of satellite germane to this discussion is a domestic, geostationary commu-
nications satellite. A geostationary satellite is placed in an equatorial orbit at an altitude of
22,300 miles above the earth. At this altitude, the equilibrium of centrifugal force and gravity
allows the satellite to complete its orbit in the same amount of time as the earth's rotation.
Thus, the satellite remains in a fixed, relative position above a given point on the earth. See A.
CHAYES, J. FAWCETT, M. ITO & A. Kiss, SATELLITE BROADCASTING 1-16 (1973); TWENTIETH
CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE, COMMUNICATING BY SATELLITE 13-33 (1969); Perle, Is the Bird
Pie in the Sky?-Communications Satellites and the Law, 27 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 325, 325
(1979); Shapiro, Epstein & Cass, Cable-Satellite Networks.- Structures and Problems, 24 CATH.
U. L. REV. 692, 694 (1975). Each geostationary satellite can "see" approximately one-third of
the earth and is equipped with 12 to 24 transponders that use solar energy to retransmit a
signal from earth, back to earth. Each transponder can retransmit one signal or channel back
to earth, either in a beam that covers the entire portion of the earth that the satellite can see or
in a spot beam to a much smaller area. Perle, Is the Bird Pie in the Sky, supra, National Cable
Television Association, CATV and Satellites, reprinted in CABLEGUIDE-FACTS, FIGURES & IS-
SUES IN CABLE TELEVISION (1971). These retransmitted signals are received from the satellite
by earth stations. See infra notes 42-49 and accompanying text. The signal relayed by a geos-
tationary satellite is quite strong because an earth-to-satellite-to-earth transmission involves
only one repeater operation, thereby avoiding the decay associated with multi-repeater sys-
tems. Moreover, because a signal transmitted to a satellite travels more vertically than hori-
zontally, only a few thousand feet of surface weather rather than long distances parallel with,
and close to, the earth's surface affect the signal. See CA TVand Satellites, supra.
FCC regulation of communications satellites began in 1965 when the first commercial
tionally, the decreasing costs associated with developing technology
have enabled private consumers to participate in this revolution.7
This private consumer participation has correspondingly increased
the incidence of telecommunication interception by private
individuals.
Unfortunately, the legal framework used to analyze pay televi-
sion reception and interception problems has not kept pace with the
technological expansion. Legal confusion derives from four sources.
First, Congress enacted the Communications Act of 1934,8 the pri-
mary legislation in this area, decades before the advent of satellite
technology. Consequently, the Act's applicability to modem circum-
stances is questionable and recent attempts at amending the Act9
have proven inadequate. Second, although the Copyright Act of
197610 addresses the transmission of copyrighted programs by pay
television programmers, the applicability of the new Copyright Act
to pay television interception remains relatively untested. Third, at-
tempts to apply the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968"1 may be futile because the Omnibus Act focuses on wire and
oral communication. Fourth, all states have enacted their own theft
of service legislation' 2 but the scope and applicability of these stat-
utes vary.
This confusion has resulted in an active debate on the issue of
pay television interception. This comment will investigate this de-
bate by reviewing the current state of available technology, noting
the methods of transmitting and intercepting pay television pro-
gramming, and analyzing the existing forms of legal protection
available to pay television suppliers. Finally, this analysis will be
applied to the complex problem presented by the reception of satel-
lite signals by earth stations' 3 owned by private consumers.
geostationary satellite was placed into service. See Communications Satellite Corp., 38 F.C.C.
1298 (1965). The Commission recognized that development of satellite technology would pro-
mote the public interest, Domestic Communication Satellite Facilities, 22 F.C.C.2d 86 (1970),
and consequently established an open-entry policy for domestic satellite proposals. Domestic
Communication Satellite Facilities, 35 F.C.C.2d 844 (1972). Because of the rapid expansion in
satellite technology, however, the Commission recently reevaluated its satellite regulatory
scheme. In the Matter of Assignment of Orbital Locations to Space Stations in the Domestic
Fixed-Satellite Service, 84 F.C.C.2d 584 (1981). As of January, 1981, the United States had
nine domestic geostationary communications satellites in orbit. For a complete history of the
regulatory steps necessitated by these satellites, see id at 587 nn.9-12. For an overview of the
plans of the corporations that own these satellites, see Special Report, Communications Satel-
lites. The Birds are in Full Flight, BROADCASTING 36-47, Nov. 19, 1979.
7. A dramatic decrease in the price of equipment necessary to receive satellite signals
enables private consumers to purchase these receiver antennas. See infra note 47 and accom-
panying text.
8. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1970).
9. See infra notes 123, 177-79 and accompanying text.
10. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-702 (1976).
11. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (1976).
12. See infra note 156 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 42-49 and accompanying text.
III. Technology
Three methods for distributing pay television exist. First, pay
programming may be originated at one site,' 4 then beamed to a sat-
ellite' 5 which reflects the signal to a distribution point,'6 from which
the programming is carried to the home through a coaxial cable.
This system has been labelled pay cable.' 7 A second alternative
sends pay programming signals to the home through the airwaves.
This over-the-air distribution operates by either sending signals from
the origination site to a multipoint distribution service (MDS) via
satellite, or by sending them directly from the origination site to the
home. The latter method is called subscription television (STV).
The third programming system beams signals from an origination
site to a satellite that retransmits a special signal directly to specially-
equipped homes. This system is known as direct broadcast satellites
(DBS).
A. Basic Cable and Pay Cable
The development of basic cable systems constituted the first ma-
jor innovation beyond conventional broadcasting.' 8 Cable systems
permit consumers to receive increased and improved conventional
broadcasting signals, rather than those available from their own
home antenna, by paying for the use of a superior community an-
14. For purposes of this comment, an origination site is the location of the pay program-
ming service's first development, assembly, packaging and sale to either a middleman (the
distributor) or directly to the ultimate receivers. The most well-known example of a pay pro-
gramming package is Home Box Office (HBO). The site from which geostationary satellites
receive HBO transmissions for nationwide distribution is the origination site.
15. See supra note 6.
16. For purposes of this discussion, a distribution point is the location that receives the
pay programming and forwards the programming to the ultimate receivers. Usually, the dis-
tributor enters into an affiliation agreement with the originator under which the distributor
agrees to pay the originator either a fixed fee or a percentage of the revenue gained by the
distributor from the ultimate receiver. The distributor usually charges the ultimate receiver by
leasing the receiver the equipment necessary to transform the distributor's signal into one ac-
ceptable by a conventional television.
17. The pay cable distributor usually operates a community antenna television (CATV)
service and a basic cable service. See infra notes 18-21 and accompanying text. Originally, the
letters CATV signified Community Antenna TV Currently, these letters denote Cable TV
See Meyer, The Feat of Houdini or How the New Act Disentangles the CATV-Copyright Knot,
22 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 545, 545 n.I (1977).
18. Regulations governing cable television 'are found at 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.1-76.617 (1981).
These regulations define a cable system as:
A non-broadcast facility consisting of a set of transmission paths and associated sig-
nal generation, reception, and control equipment, under common ownership and
control, that distributes or is designed to distribute to subscribers the signals of one or
more television broadcast stations, but such term shall not include (1) any such facil-
ity that serves fewer than 50 subscribers, or (2) any such facility that serves or will
serve only subscribers in one or more multiple unit dwellings under common owner-
ship, control or management.
47 C.F.R. § 76.5(a) (1981). For a complete discussion of the cable television industry, see
Stem, The Evolution of Cable Television Regulation.- A Proposal/or the Future, 21 U"t. L.
ANN. 179 (1981).
tenna.' 9 The main antenna delivers programming to an individual's
home via a coaxial cable2" and provides a multichannel capacity.2 '
Although access to cable is increasing,22 the high cost of the cable
itself limits this growth.23 Consequently, "[1]arge segments of
America will never have cable."24
A basic cable system operator adds a pay cable capability by
purchasing an earth station to receive satellite transmissions 25 from a
19. The FCC began regulation of the cable industry to protect local broadcasters. One
commentator notes that "[t]he Commission feared that communities would support cable sys-
tems that supplied distant programming rather than local stations." Stem, The Evolution of
Cable Television Regulation, supra note 18, at 188 n.57. See also Synchef, Municipal Ownershp
of Cable Television Systems, 12 U.S.F.L. REV. 205, 219 (1978). Consequently, the FCC re-
quires cable systems to carry the programming of any broadcaster within a 35 mile radius as
well as the programming of other broadcasters significantly viewed in the area. These signals
are described as must-carry signals. 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.51-.57 (1981).
20. Subscription to a cable system usually entails paying a monthly or yearly fee. Con-
sumers who subscribe receive a "feed" or "drop" from the main cable to their home and any
equipment necessary to display the signals on a conventional television set. FCC STAFF RE-
PORT, supra note 2, at 17.
21. The first cable systems carried only a few channels; newer systems have a capacity of
up to 100 channels. Stern, The Evolution of Cable Television Regulation, supra note 18, at 180
n.6.
22. "By 1980, 44 percent of the total 76 million television households were passed by
cable, and 50 percent of the homes passed subscribed to cable." FCC STAFF REPORT, supra
note 2, at 27 (citing Homes Passed by Cable, MDS Figures Added to Home Video Market
Tabulation, Knowledge Industries Publications, HOME VIDEO REPORT 23, May 5, 1980). By
1985, an estimated 58% of television homes will be passed by cable. Pay TV Newsletter 2, Paul
Kagan Associates, July 5, 1978. See also Rappaport, The Emergence of Subscription Cable
Television and Its Role in Communications, 29 FED. COM. B.J. 301 (1976).
23. The high cost of coaxial cable poses a major economic obstacle to complete market
penetration by cable systems. "Installing cable is generally considered unprofitable in areas
having fewer than 30 homes per mile passed." FCC STAFF REPORT, supra note 2, at 25. See
also Testimony of Richard L. Brown Before the Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Con-
sumer Protection, and Finance: House Commerce Committee, U.S. House of Representatives,
regarding H.R. 4727, Nov. 17, 1981 at 3 [hereinafter cited as Testimony of Brown] (At this
writing, the official transcripts of the Subcommittee hearings of November 17, 1981, have not
been published. Page numbers cited refer to a copy of testimony supplied by the Society for
Private and Commercial Earth Stations (SPACE)). Consequently, "[a]s of 1979, no cable sys-
tems existed where there were fewer than 10 homes per mile." FCC STAFF REPORT, supra
note 2, at 25 (citing Report and Order, Docket 78-219, adopted Nov. 29, 1979; released Dec.
11, 1979). Similarly, laying cable in densely-populated, high-rise intensive urban areas in-
volves great expense. FCC STAFF REPORT, supra note 2, at 25. The National Cable Television
Association, Inc., estimates that, in 1973, construction costs varied "from $4,000 per mile of
cable in rural areas to upwards of $75,000 per mile in major urban areas." National Cable
Television Association, Cable Television Fact Sheet, CATV News Release, February 1973.
Some experts believe that a growing demand, coupled with technological changes that
lower the cost per mile, may result in further market penetration even in high-cost areas. FCC
STAFF REPORT, supra note 2, at 25 (citing Herbert H. Howard, Subscription Television: Pre-
paredfor the National Association of Broadcasters, 10, August 1980). Furthermore, because
many cable companies lease telephone poles to carry their cable, the FCC's recent decision to
allow rural telephone companies to own their own cable television facilities should reduce total
cable costs and encourage the growth of cable systems in rural areas. See FCC STAFF RE-
PORT, supra note 2, at 25; Report and Order, Docket 78-219, adopted Nov. 29, 1979, released
Dec. 11, 1979. Despite these possibilities for reduced cable costs, some industry experts believe
that "[i]t is entirely possible that in excess of 30 percent of the U.S. population will never have
a chance to obtain cable service." Testimony of Brown, supra at 4.
24. Testimony of Brown, supra note 23, at 3.
25. See infra notes 42-49 and accompanying text.
pay programming supplier.26 After entering an affiliation agreement
with the supplier,27 the pay service is "piggybacked" on the system's
basic cable service for an additional fee. As with basic cable, high
costs will prevent large segments of America from having access to
pay cable.
B. Over-The-Air Systems. MDS and STV
Over-the-air systems developed to supply pay programming to
areas that, because of prohibitive costs, 28 lack access to cable. These
systems, however, provide only one channel of pay programming, as
opposed to pay cable's multichannel capacity. 9
One type of over-the-air pay programming, MDS,30 sends the
pay signal from the originator to a satellite which reflects the signal
to a distributor. From the distributor, a microwave transmitter sends
MDS signals to fixed reception points, usually at subscriber's homes.
This service requires that each subscribing home3' maintain a special
antenna and converter to transform the signal into a type capable of
reception by conventional television sets.32 Because development of
this technology has coincided with easing FCC restraints,3 3 the fu-
26. While the most common originating suppliers are commercial-free systems like HBO,
see supra note 14, a new concept, the superstation, is gaining increased recognition. A super-
station is nothing more than a local broadcasting station, the programming of which is beamed
to a satellite and distributed nationwide. Robert E. (Ted) Turner III originated this concept.
Turner created Southern Satellite Systems (SSS), which leases a transponder on a satellite and
uses it to retransmit Atlanta's Channel 17 to cable systems. SSS then charges those cable
systems that retransmit the signal to their local subscribers. The FCC approved the applica-
tion of SSS in Southern Satellite Systems, Inc., 62 F.C.C.2d 153 (1976) and found that this
system allows a "more efficient utilization of existing communications capacity... by carriers
with special expertise." 62 F.C.C.2d at 159. Nevertheless, despite the carriers' expertise,
problems still exist. One commentator remarks:
Today, more than five million people throughout the country can watch Atlanta's
Channel 17 programming. This has led. . . to such bizarre results as the advertising
on Channel 17 by an Atlanta supermarket of a special on roast beef. Cable viewers
in Boston saw the ad, did not realize it was addressed to Atlanta viewers and rushed
to the store of the same name in Boston, only to be told by a thoroughly perplexed
manager that he did not have a sale on roast beef and had certainly not advertised it
on television.
Perle, Is the Bird Pie in the SkyZ supra note 6, at 329-30 (1979).
27. See supra note 16.
28. See supra note 23.
29. See supra note 21.
30. MDS regulations are found at 47 C.F.R. §§ 21.900-.908 (1981). See also Licensing,
and Regulation of Common Carrier Radio Stations in the Multipoint Distribution Service, 45
F.C.C.2d 616 (1974).
31. The developers of MDS originally intended the service to be used by commercial
establishments; however, individual households have increasingly purchased the service. See
Notice of Inquiry and Proposed Rulemaking, CC Docket 80-116, adopted March 19, 1980,
released May 2, 1980, FCC 80-141.
32. See Home Box Office v. Advanced Consumer Technology, No. 81 Civ. 559, slip op.
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 1981) [hereinafter cited as HBO v. ACT]; Chartwell Communications
Group v. Westbrook, 637 F.2d 459, 464 n.3 (1980).
33. A proposed FCC rule would increase the number of available channels for MDS in a
given area from two to thirty-three, provided sufficient demand exists. Notice of Inquiry, Pro-
ture for MDS appears promising. 34
With the other type of over-the-air pay programming, STV,
35
an originating programmer sends signals to a subscriber's home,
without the use of a satellite. Specifically, the programmer sends
scrambled signals through the air that must be decoded by a device
that the subscriber rents and attaches to his set.36 STV has not
spread as widely as cable because the FCC has imposed rules that
restrict the development of this service.37
C. DBS and Other Satellite Systems
DBS may become the dominant delivery system in the future.
With this system, a satellite reflects a specially coded signal received
by a small dish-shaped antenna located at the subscriber's home.
This small dish converts only compatibly-coded signals. DBS
promises three benefits. First, it allows for a more concentrated sig-
nal that produces clearer reception than current technologies afford.
Second, if produced in large numbers, the DBS earth terminal might
cost as little as $200 to $300. Third, this type of broadcasting would
be intended for the general public. Thus, this technology would en-
able service to areas that are not currently served by other cable sys-
tems because of cost-effectiveness problems.38
posed Rulemaking and Order, in Gen. Docket 80-112, adopted March 19, 1980, released May
I, 1980, FCC 80-136.
34. "As of April 1980, 54 MDS stations offered video programming and applications had
been filed or permits granted in 312 cities," FCC STAFF REPORT, supra note 2, at 29 (citing
MDS Data Book 1, Paul Kagan Associates, Inc., May 1980), and "It]he number of pay sub-
scribers to MDS has been predicted to grow from 250,000 to 2,000,000 by 1985." FCC STAFF
REPORT, supra note 2, at 29 (citing 190 MULTICAST 1, May 29, 1980).
35. STV regulations are found at 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.641-.644 (1981). The regulations define
a subscription television program as "[a] television broadcast program intended to be received
in intelligible form by members of the public only for a fee or charge." 47 C.F.R. § 73.641(b)
(1981). Current FCC rules require an STV station to carry at least 28 hours of conventional
programming per week after the station's first two-and-a-half years of operation. 47 C.F.R.
§ 73.643 (1981).
36. STV subscribers may only lease, not buy, STV decoders. 47 C.F.R. § 73.642(0(3)
(1981). See also Fourth Report and Order in the Matter of Amendment of Part 73 of the
Commission's Rules and Regulations to Provide for Subscription Television Service, 15
F.C.C.2d 466, 467 n.10 (1968); In the Matter of Amendment of Part 73 of the Commission's
Rules and Regulations to Provide for Subscription Television Service, 3 F.C.C.2d I n. I (1966);
FCC Letting STV Out of the Closet, BROADCASTING 23, Oct. 1, 1979.
37. The FCC initially restricted STV availability to communities having at least four
conventional television signals and allowed only one STV station in each of these qualifying
markets. Fourth Report and Order in the Amendment of Part 73, 15 F.C.C.2d 466 (1968). In
1980, the FCC modified the one-to-a-community rule to allow as many STV signals as fre-
quency assignments would permit. The restriction of STV to communities with at least four
conventional signals, however, remains unchanged. See First Report and Order in Docket No.
21502, FCC 79-535, released Oct. 12, 1979; FCC STAFF REPORT, supra note 2, at 28. Because
of the easing restrictions, "seven new STV applications in six cities have been granted, and 58
more are pending." Id See also The Status of STVas of 2/29/80, Pay TV Newsletter, March
7, 1980. One source projects that by 1984, "45 STV stations will be in operation." FCC STAFF
REPORT, supra note 2, at 28. See also Pay TV Newsletter, Jan. 23, 1980.
38. See FCC STAFF REPORT, supra note 2; Special Report, The Curtain's Going Up on
DBS Television's Next Frontier, BROADCASTING 36, Sept. 15, 1980; see generally Comment,
Satellites also transmit signals not intended as pay program-
ming. These signals include three religious networks,39 live coverage
of the United States House of Representatives, 40 and network-to-af-
filiate transmissions intended for future use by the affiliate. The net-
work-to-affiliate transmissions include unedited, commercial-free
news, mini-series, and the Tonight Show.4'
D. Earth Stations and a Legal Dilemma.
In each pay system that includes satellite transmissions, an
earthbound device is necessary to receive the signals sent by the sat-
ellite. The device, known as an earth station or television-receive-
only antenna (TVRO), has the capability of receiving all signals sent
via satellite that fall in the general area and can collect the signals
for ultimate transmission to the viewer's television. Originally, the
prohibitively high cost of these devices 42 and an extensive FCC li-
censing procedure 43 allowed only basic cable operators with large
subscriber bases to take advantage of this technology. These large
basic cable services would purchase a TVRO and gain a pay cable
capability. 44 Since the initial cost of the TVRO necessitated a large
subscriber base, cable systems enjoyed a near monopoly on pay tele-
vision. As the price decreased, however, satellite master antennas
(SMATVs) were created to to serve a smaller subscriber base. 45  De-
Direct Broadcast Satellites: Protecting Rights of Contributing Artists and Broadcasting Organi-
zations, 12 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 204 (1982). The high initial costs ofa DBS system necessitates a
favorable regulatory scheme to foster growth. See In the Matter of Inquiry into the Develop-
ment of Regulatory Policy in Regard to Direct Broadcast Satellites, Gen. Docket No. 80-603,
Adopted April 21, 1981, Released June 1, 1981, FCC 81-181.
39. The three religious networks transmitted by satellite are Christian Broadcasting Net-
work, Praise the Lord, and Trinity Broadcasting. All three permit viewing at no charge if
permission is requested. See Kral, All Signals Clear, SAT GUIDE 51, 54, Sept. 1981.
40. Cable Satellite Public Affairs Network (C-SPAN) provides coverage of the U.S.
House of Representatives as well as speeches and roundtable discussions by various politicians
and journalists. See C-SPAN: Carving Out a New Programming Niche, BROADCASTING 48,
Nov. 3, 1980.
41. The network sends these unedited and commercial free transmissions to their affili-
ates, who then tape the programming for later broadcast. See Kral, All Signals Clear, supra
note 39.
42. In 1975, a satellite earth station cost $ 100,000. Testimony of Brown, supra note 23, at
5.
43. See Establishment of Policies and Procedures to Provide Specialized Common Car-
rier Services, 29 F.C.C.2d 870 (1971).
44. See supra. notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
45. TVROs may be used to create satellite master antennas (SMATVs) that serve multi-
ple dwelling units such as apartment buildings, hotels, or trailer parks. An SMATV operator
usually enters into an affiliation agreement with the originator similar to the agreements en-
tered into by cable operators. See supra note 16. SMATV systems then receive a few satellite
signals, including a pay service, and offer the signals for a fee. The fee is collected from each
tenant of an apartment building or from the management of a hotel. Special Report.- Small
Earth Stations Blossom Into Big Businesses, BROADCASTING 31, Dec. 22, 1980; see also
SMATV An Overview, SAT GUIDE 19, Jan. 1982. Before the advent of TVROs, a large
conventional antenna, a master antenna (MATV), provided the same type of conventional
broadcasting for a fee. Special Report, supra.
clining prices coupled with the FCC's virtual elimination of the li-
censing requirement46 has resulted in an increasing number of
privately-owned TVROs.47 Because a TVRO can receive all satellite
transmissions falling in the area, a private owner can receive signals
meant for general distribution,48 as well as those intended to be sold
by distributors, without paying a monthly service charge.49 With the
growing number of privately-owned TVROs, pay television opera-
tors face a greater possibility of losing subscribers who purchase
their own TVRO to receive these transmissions. Thus, an un-
resolved question becomes more urgent: Are TVROs legal?
IV. Existing Protections Against Interception
A. The Communications Act of 1934 and Section 605
The provisions of the Communications Act of 1934,50 the pri-
mary legislation regarding radio communication, undisputedly apply
to television signals." Section 60552 of the Act controls communica-
tion interception and prohibits unauthorized interception, when ac-
companied by a beneficial use, of radio communication. Section
605, however, includes a proviso which specifically exempts radio
communication broadcast for use of the general public from its
prohibitions. Because the scope of this proviso may determine a
transmission's protection under section 605 against interception, the
46. In 1979, the FCC opted for the following modifications in TVRO licensing
procedures:
(1) Immediate implementation of a voluntary licensing program for receive-only
earth stations;
(2) Complete deregulation of unlicensed receive-only earth stations;
(3) Initiation of a rulemaking proceeding to . . . establish . . . specific procedures
for possible further deregulation and the investigation of possible total deregula-
tion of all receive-only earth stations.
In the Matter of Regulation of Domestic Receive-Only Satellite Earth Stations, 74 F.C.C.2d
205, 206 (1979). See also, e.g., Deregulating the Dishes." FCC Lets Loose Earth Stations,
BROADCASTING 28, Oct. 22, 1979; FCC Drops Frequency Coordination Rule.- Moves Toward
Deregulation of TVROs, TVC NEWS 18, Nov. I, 1979.
47. A great dispartiy exists among the estimates of current, average TVRO prices, the
number of TVROs in existence, and the rate of TVRO production. The rapid acceleration of
the industry provides one explanation for this disparity. See Testimony of Brown, supra note
23, at 6 (average price: $3,500-10,000; installations in place: 30,000; rate of production: 2,000-
3,000 per month); Kral, All Signals Clear, supra note 39, at 52 (average price: $10,000; installa-
tions in place: 7,500; rate of production: 250 per month). See also Satellite Week 5, April 27,
1981. Estimates project a future market size of up to five million TVROs. See Special Report-
Small Earth Stations Blossom Into Big Businesses, BROADCASTING 31, 34, Dec. 22, 1980. See
also Home Satellite TV Grows But Dispute Clouds Its Future, Los Angeles Times, May 25,
1981, at i, column 3.
48. Programming on the free religious networks is intended for general distribution. See
supra note 39.
49. A pay cable operator's TVRO has the capability of receiving signals intended for
either general or controlled distribution. Nevertheless, the operator sells only those signals for
which he contracted in the affiliation agreement with the supplier.
50. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1970).
51. See e.g., Allen B. DuMont Laboratories v. Carroll, 184 F.2d 153, 155 (3d Cir. 1950).
52. 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1970).
proviso lies at the center of the pay television protection controversy.
Construing the proviso requires a review of section 605's origins and
legislative history. Additionally, a survey of the caselaw arising
under the section will demonstrate the proviso's application.
1. Legislative History. -Congress first attempted to signifi-
cantly address the developing technology of radio communication in
the Radio Act of 1912.11 The 1912 Act accomplished two purposes.
First, the Act required the operator of any radio used for interstate
or foreign commercial intercourse to obtain a license.54 Second, the
Act developed a regulatory pattern to allocate radio frequencies for
specified purposes." Regulations promulgated under the 1912 Act
controlled interference with radio communication between stations
and facilitated receipt of radio signals.5 6 Regulation 19 under the
1912 Act,57 predecessor to section 605, provided that, subject to crim-
inal penalties, no person connected with the operation of any station
could divulge or publish the contents of messages transmitted or re-
ceived by the station, except to authorized receivers., Since very
few commercial broadcast stations existed in 1912, the drafters prob-
ably directed the regulation toward the divulging or publishing of
point-to-point transmissions.5 9 Regulation 19 failed to address un-
authorized interception or reception of radio communications be-
cause the equipment necessary for unauthorized receipt of such
transmissions was not freely available.6 °
53. Pub. L. No. 62-264, 37 Stat. 302 (1912) (superseded by Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L.
No. 69-632, 44 Stat. 1162).
The federal government first regulated radio under the Wireless Ship Act of June 24,
1910, Pub. L. No. 61-262, 36 Stat. 629. This Act forbade steamer ships to leave any American
port without an apparatus for radio communication and a skilled operator. Two years later,
Congress enacted the Radio Act of 1912 to fulfill the obligation of the United States under the
first international radio treaty, the Wireless Telegraph Convention, 37 Stat. 1565 (1912). See
National Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
54. § 1, 37 Stat. 302.
55. § 2, 37 Stat. 302, 303.
56. § 4, 37 Stat. 302, 304. The Secretary of Commerce and Labor enforced the regula-
tions promulgated under the Radio Act of 1912. Id This regulatory structure is the forerun-
ner of the current FCC regulatory structure. See infra note 75.
57. § 4, Regulation 19, 37 Stat. 302, 307.
58. d Regulation 19 provides in part:
No person or persons engaged in or having knowledge of the operation of any station
or stations, shall divulge or publish the contents of any messages transmitted or re-
ceived by such station, except to the person or persons to whom the same may be
directed, or their authorized agent, or to another station employed to forward such
message to its destination. ...
Id A violation of this regulation %'as punishable "by a fine of not more than two-hundred and
fifty dollars or imprisonment for a period of not exceeding three months, or both... " Id
59. Note 69 infra, discusses the distinction between point-to-point transmissions and
broadcasting.
60. In HBO v. ACT, supra note 32, at -, the court discussed Regulation 19's omission of
any reference to unauthorized interception or reception of radio communications. The court
stated that Congress failed to address this problem
[blecause the principal problem faced by commercial users was the possibility that
confidential messages would be disclosed by radio operators and other persons di-
The Radio Act of 192761 superseded the Act of 1912. Congress
enacted the 1927 Act in response to chaos created by rapid develop-
ment and expansion of commercial broadcast stations.62 The 1927
Act created the Federal Radio Commission (FRC) and gave the
FRC broad authority over the radio industry. The most explicit gui-
dance given the FRC was that it should act for "public convenience,
interest, or necessity."63
Section 27 of the 1927 Act subsumed the prohibition against di-
vulgence contained in regulation 19.64 Although the Senate Report
described the prohibitions contained in section 27 as largely a redraft
of existing law,6" this description was clearly inaccurate in two im-
portant respects. First, section 27 extended the limited protection af-
forded under regulation 19 by restricting unauthorized interception
and reception of radio communications, in addition to prohibiting
their divulgence.66 Second, section 27 exempted from these prohibi-
tions any communications "broadcasted or transmitted by amateurs
or others for the use of the general public ... 67 The intended
scope of the section 27 exemption, however, was unclear. One court
explained that the sender's desire to either keep the communication
private or to permit access by the general public determined the
scope of the exemption.6" The nature of communications classifica-
tion presents an alternative interpretation. The FCC classified com-
rectly involved in the transmission process. Equipment that would have allowed the
unauthorized reception of radio transmissions was not yet so widely available as to
cause concern. Thus, in enacting Regulation Nineteen, Congress sought to promote
the growth of radio for commercial purposes by providing for all administratively
authorized transmissions for which the sender desired confidentiality.
Id at -. This description of congressional intent is based only on speculation.
61. Pub. L. No. 69-632, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927) (superseded by Communications Act of
1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1970)).
62. The first standard broadcast stations appeared in the early 1920's. By 1925, more
stations existed than available frequencies. The courts restricted attempts by the Secretary of
Commerce and Labor to handle the situation by holding that the Secretary's actions exceeded
his authority. See, e.g., Hoover v. Intercity Radio Co., 286 F. 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1923); United
States v. Zenith Radio Corp., 12 F.2d 614 (N.D. Ill. 1926). Consequently, the Secretary aban-
doned all efforts to regulate radio and urged self-regulation by the stations. Chaos resulted.
See National Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 210-12 (1943).
63. Federal Radio Commission v. Nelson Brothers Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U.S. 266.
285 (1933).
64. Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-632, § 27, 44 Stat. 1162, 1172.
65. S. REP. No. 722, 69th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1926).
66. One court explains that, rather than a redraft of regulation 19, section 27 was "an
extension of protections apparently necessitated by the increasingly widespread availability of
equipment capable of receiving radio transmissions intended for private use. Congress ex-
tended the protection in Regulation 19 to ensure that technological developments did not un-
dermine the guarantees of confidentiality" provided by the 1912 Act. HBO v. ACT, supra note
32, at -
67. § 27, 44 Stat. 1162, 1172.
68. In HBO v. ACT, supra note 32, the court suggested that the section 27 exemption
responded to the growth of broadcast stations that wanted their transmissions to reach all
potential listeners. Therefore, the exemption "was aimed at enabling those who wished to
reach the general public to do so without fear; it was not motivated by any expressed intention
to permit access to signals that senders wished to keep from the general public." Id at -.
munications as either point-to-point or broadcasting. 69  Point-to-
point communications transmit to specified receiving points while
broadcast services transmit to the public at large. Congress may
have intended section 27 as a prohibition against unauthorized inter-
ception of point-to-point communications with an exemption for the
interception of all broadcast services regardless of the intent of the
broadcaster.70
The Communications Act of 19347t replaced the Radio Act of
1927. Congress intended the 1934 Act "to make available. . . to all
the people of the United States a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and
world-wide wire and radio communication service with adequate fa-
cilities at reasonable charges ... 72 Congress hoped to accomplish
this goal by "centralizing authority heretofore granted by law to sev-
eral agencies and by granting additional authority" 73 to the newly
created Federal Communications Commission.74 Thus, the FCC ac-
quired functions and wide discretion similar to, and in certain in-
stances even greater than, the FRC.75
With only a few minor changes, Section 27 of the Radio Act of
1927 became Section 605 of the 1934 Act.7 6 Section 605 provides in
69. L. Caldwell, The New Rules and Regulations of the Federal Radio Commission, 2 J.
RADIO L. 66, 76 (1932). The distinction between broadcasting and point-to-point transmis-
sions is "that broadcast services [are] those in which communications [are] directed to an inde-
terminate public at large, while point-to-point services [are] those carrying on communications
addressed to one or more specified receiving points." FCC STAFF REPORT, supra note 2, at
117 (citing R. Homburg, The Next World Conference at Madrid and the International Regula-
tion of Electric and Radioelectric Transmission, I J. RADIO L. 220, 226 (1931).
70. When Congress drafted section 27, the hybrid transmission did not exist. A hybrid
transmission is a transmission that is of interest to many but that is intended only for those
who pay a fee. Thus, Congress drafted the section without considering a service that fit neither
the point-to-point nor broadcasting mold.
71. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1970), Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934).
72. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1970).
73. Id
74. See S. REP. No. 781, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); H. REP. No. 1850, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1934).
75. 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1970). The Communications Act of 1934 accorded the FCC discre-
tion similar to that of the FRC to act "as public convenience, interest, or necessity re-
quires... ." Id See also National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 215-17
(1943); Federal Communications Commission v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 139
(1940). The 1934 Act gave the FCC authority to assign frequencies, determine power use, and
regulate operation periods for each radio station. 47 U.S.C. § 303(c). This control of the radio
spectrum, combined with other explicit powers, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 303(g) (study new uses for
radio and encourage more effective use of radio in the public interest), and the authority to
promulgate "necessary" regulations, 47 U.S.C. § 303(r), has given the FCC a virtual monopoly
on regulating the development of new radio technologies. But cf. note 4 supra (FCC moving
towards deregulation in some areas). For these reasons, one court labeled the 1934 Act the
"high-water mark of Congressional abdication of power to the regulatory agency." HBO v.
ACT, supra note 32, at - (quoting IV B. SCHWARTZ, THE ECONOMIC REGULATION OF Busi-
NESS AND INDUSTRY 2374 (1973)).
76. 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1970). Committee reports on the Communications Act of 1934
stated that "[s]ection 605, prohibiting unauthorized publication of communications, is based
on § 27 of the Radio Act, but is also made to apply to wire communications." H. REP. No.
1850, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1934). See S. REP. No. 781, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934). The final
proviso of section 605, which excludes certain transmissions from the section's prohibitions, is
part:
No person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any
radio communication and divulge or publish the existence, con-
tents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such intercepted
communication to any person. . . or use such communication for
his own benefit or for the benefit of another not entitled thereto.
This section shall not apply to the receiving, divulging, publishing,
or utilizing the contents of any radio communication which is
broadcast or transmitted by amateurs or others for the use of the
general public. . . 7
Unlike the 1927 Act, the 1934 Act specifically defined broadcasting
in Section 153:78 "'Broadcasting' means the dissemination of radio
communications intended to be received by the public, directly or by
intermediary relay stations."' 79 The interplay of section 605 and sec-
tion 153 has resulted in two separate lines of reasoning employed by
courts faced with the issue of whether section 605 provides a certain
communication with protection against interception.
2. Case Law Interpretation of Section 605.-Initially, a court
faced with an alleged violation of section 60580 must determine the
identical to section 27 of the 1927 Act "except the word broadcasted in the 1927 Act was
changed to 'broadcast,' and a comma was added to separate the word from the rest of the
phrase." HBO v. ACT, supra note 32. The language of section 605 underwent minor changes
in wording and punctuation when the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,
Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197, amended the section.
77. 47 U.S.C. § 605 (Supp. 1982). The full text of section 605 provides the following:
Except as authorized by chapter 119, Title 19, no person receiving, assisting in receiv-
ing, transmitting, or assisting in transmitting, any interstate or foreign communica-
tion by wire or radio shall divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance,
purport, effect, or meaning thereof, except through authorized channels of transmis-
sion or reception, (1) to any person other than the addressee, his agent, or attorney,
(2) to a person employed or authorized to forward such communication to its destina-
tion, (3) to proper accounting or distributing officers of the various communicating
centers over which the communication may be passed, (4) to the master of a ship
under whom he is serving, (5) in response to a subpoena issued by a court of compe-
tent jurisdiction, or (6) on demand of other lawful authority. No person being au-
thorized by the sender shall intercept any radio communication and divulge or
publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such inter-
cepted communication to any person. No person not being entitled thereto shall re-
ceive or assist in receiving any interstate or foreign communication by radio and use
such communication (or any information therein contained) for his own benefit or
for the benefit of another not entitled thereto. No person having received any inter-
cepted radio communication or having become acquainted with the contents, sub-
stance, purport, effect, or meaning of such communication (or any part thereof)
knowing that such communication was intercepted, shall divulge or publish the exist-
ence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such communication (or any
part thereof) or use such communication (or any information therein contained) for
his own benefit or for the benefit of another not entitled thereto. This section shall
not apply to the receiving, divulging, publishing or utilizing the contents of any radio
communication which is broadcast or transmitted by amateurs or others for the use
of the general public, or which relates to ships in distress.
78. 47 U.S.C. § 153(o) (1970).
79. Id The 1934 Act derived the definition of broadcasting from a nearly identical defi-
nition of "broadcasting service" in Article I of the Washington International Radio Telegraph
Convention of 1927. See S. REP. No. 781, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1934); H. REP. No. 1850, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1934). The Radio Telegraph Convention's definitions adopted the same
point-to-point versus broadcasting dichotomy described in note 69 supra.
80. Plaintiffs suing under section 605 have three remedies. First, section 501 of the Corn-
scope of the language that exempts communications broadcast for
the use of the general public from the section's prohibitions against
interception. If the transmission falls within this exemption, no vio-
lation of section 605 has occurred.
The early line of cases employed the point-to-point versus
broadcasting dichotomy."' Section 605 protected point-to-point
communications; however, if the transmission was classified as
broadcasting under section 153, the transmission fell within the ex-
emption to the interception prohibitions of section 605. Using this
reasoning, the language "for the use of the general public" in the
exemption was treated as surplusage or merely a repetition of the
broadcasting definition. The more recent line of cases rejects this
construction. Using the more contemporary reasoning, a transmis-
sion must both satisfy the definition of broadcasting and be broad-
cast for the use of the general public in order for the exemption from
interception protection to apply. This view regards the additional
exemption language "for the use of the general public" not as sur-
plusage but as an additional requirement for exemption from section
605 protections.
Initial FCC decisions construing the 1934 Act demonstrated the
distinction between broadcasting and point-to-point communication.
The distinction was based on whether the transmission held "any
general interest for the public." 2 If such general interest existed, the
FCC classified the transmission broadcasting. Conversely, if no gen-
eral interest existed, the FCC classified the transmission point-to-
point as in Bremer Broadcasting Company. 3
A court first interpreted the section 153 definition of broadcast-
ing in Functional Music, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commis-
sion. 84 In Functional Music, the court ruled that a subscription
munications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 501 (1970), provides a criminal penalty of$ 10,000 in fines, or one
year imprisonment, or both, for the willful and knowing violation of any provision of the Act.
Sellers of unauthorized STV decoders received this type of penalty in United States v. West-
brook, 502 F. Supp. 588 (E.D. Mich. 1980). Second, the courts permit a finding of civil liabil-
ity. Circuit Judge Learned Hand first announced this remedy in Reitmeister v. Reitmeister,
162 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1947), and it was reaffirmed in KMLA Broadcasting Corp. v. Twentieth
Century Cigarette Vendors Corp., 264 F. Supp. 35, 43 (C.D. Ca. 1967). See also Pugach v.
Dillinger, 277 F.2d 739, 743 (2d Cir. 1960); United States v. Goldstein, 120 F.2d 485, 490 (2d
Cir. 1941). Third, a private right of action for injunctive relief has been granted against the
manufacturers and sellers of unauthorized STV decoders. Chartwell Communications Group
v. Westbrook, 637 F.2d 459 (6th Cir. 1980).
81. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
82. Adelaide Lillian Carrell, 7 F.C.C. 219, 222 (1939).
83. 2 F.C.C. 79 (1935). In Bremer, the FCC made a broadcasting versus point-to-point
determination when a licensed broadcaster attempted to renew a broadcast license. The FCC
discovered that the station made some point-to-point transmissions inconsistently with the
terms of the station license. These transmissions consisted of coded horse race results deci-
pherable only by those who owned special "scratch-sheets." Id See also Adelaide Lillian
Carrel, 7 F.C.C. 219 (1939) (police transmissions classified as point-to-point); Scroggin and
Company Bank, I F.C.C. 194 (1935) (advice for specific listeners classified as point-to-point).
84. 274 F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir. 1958). The Functional Music case arose when broadcasting
music operation which provided background music without adver-
tisements constituted broadcasting within section 153. The court
found that a Bremer-type point-to-point transmission "by its very
nature negates an intent for public distribution"85 whereas a sub-
scription music service "can be . . .of interest to the general radio
audience."86 The court further held that "[b]roadcasting remains
broadcasting even though a segment of those capable of receiving
the broadcast signal are equipped to delete a portion of that
signal."87
In Amendment of Part 73, 8 the FCC applied similar reasoning
in finding "that the reverse also holds, namely, that broadcasting re-
mains broadcasting even though a segment of the public is unable to
view programs without special equipment."89 This determination
supported the FCC's position that STV90 falls within the section 153
definition of broadcasting.9" Having classified STV as broadcasting,
the FCC next questioned whether provisions of the Communications
Act pertaining to broadcast stations should apply to STV in the same
manner that they apply to regular broadcasting. The Commission
answered in the affirmative. In reviewing these broadcast-related
provisions, the FCC observed: "[S]ection 605 prohibits the unau-
thorized publication of communications, but expressly exempts 'the
station WFMF restricted its programming format to background music that contained adver-
tisements. WFMF also provided a simplex subscription music service by which subscribers
paid a fee for equipment that deleted the advertisements. Because the FCC determined that
this programming did not constitute broadcasting, WFMF, which was licensed to provide a
broadcasting service, could not properly transmit this type of programming. As an alternative,
the FCC required WFMF to develop a secondary multiplexed transmission system. WFMF
challenged this determination successfully, the court holding that the FCC erred.
85. Id at 548.
86. Id
87. Id
88. Amendment of Part 73 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations to Provide for
Subscription Television Service, 3 F.C.C.2d 1 (1966).
89. Id at 10.
90. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
91. The FCC first considered STV as broadcasting in Amendment of Part 73, 3 F.C.C.2d
1 (1966). To bolster this determination, the FCC stated:
It might be argued that such programs [subscription programs] are not "intended
to be received by the public" since their intended receipt would be limited to mem-
bers of the public willing to pay the specified price. But, absence of any charge for
the program is not made a prerequisite of "broadcasting" operations under the pres-
ent language of section 3(o). And the reliance of the broadcasting industry upon
advertising revenue, rather than upon direct charge to the public as its principal
source of revenue, has not been the result of any action by either Congress or the
Commission, but rather the result of the natural development of the industry. It
would appear that the primary touchstone of a broadcast service is the intent of the
broadcaster to provide radio or television program service without discrimination to
as many members of the general public as can be interested in the particular program
as distinguished from a point-to-point message service to specified individuals * * *
while particular subscription programs might have a special appeal to some segment
of the potential audience, this is equally true of a substantial portion of the program-
ming now transmitted by broadcasting stations.
Id at 9. Amendment of Part 73, Fourth Report and Order, 15 F.C.C.2d 466 (1968), reaffirmed
this finding.
contents of any radio communication broadcast' from its applica-
tion."' 92 This observation is significant. Omission of the exemption's
remaining language--"for the use of the general public" 9 3-indi-
cates that the FCC did not consider this language crucial in inter-
preting the scope of the exemption. Thus, the FCC exempted all
transmissions classified as broadcasting, including STV, from the
protection of section 605. 9'
KML4 Broadcasting Corp. v. Twentieth Century Cigarette Ven-
dors Corp. 95 constitutes the first examination of the interplay of sec-
tion 605 and section 153. The KMLA court held that section 605
protected multiplex background music transmissions as nonpublic
radio communications. The court characterized these transmissions
as similar to point-to-point communications because the material
was "of interest only to a particular person or persons. ' 96 Because
these transmissions were intended solely for reception by industrial,
mercantile, and other subscribers, the transmissions did not consti-
tute section 153 broadcasting 97 and consequently their unauthorized
92. 3 F.C.C.2d at 11.
93. 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1970).
94. The FCC later modified the position that all broadcasting rules should apply to STV
merely because the Commission classified STV as broadcasting. Noting that this position im-
plied that no differences existed between conventional television and STV, the FCC stated:
"We are not surca-%,. i -.. .. 15 F.C.C.2d at 575. The Commission decided, however,
that "the rules applicable to free TV broadcast stations should be applicable to STV opera-
tions." Id at 575-76. Nevertheless, the Commission reserved the right to change this situa-
tion. Judicial decisions aside, the FCC's official position exempting both STV and
conventional broadcasting from the protection of section 605 remains unchanged. But see
FCC Public Notice No. 11850, Jan. 24, 1979 (MDS service protected by section 605); FCC
STAFF REPORT, supra note 2, at 126 n. I (section 605 should protect both MDS and STY).
95. 264 F. Supp. 35 (C.D. Ca. 1967). KMLA adopted the multiplexing system described
in Functional Music, see supra note 84, to distribute background music receivable only by
special equipment supplied by KMLA for a fee. The defendant, Twentieth Century, supplied
equipment capable of receiving KMLA's transmissions to commercial establishments that
agreed to accept Twentieth Century's cigarette vending machines. See Casenote, Unfair Com-
petition-Associated Press Doctrine-Unauthorized Reception and Use of Multiplex Channel
FM Transmissions Intended for Subscribers Constitutes Unfair Competition, 9 ARIz. L. REV.
315 (1967); Casenote, Federal Communication Law and Unfair Competition.- Clearing Up Some
Static for Pay TV and Radio. Unauthorized Reception of Non-Broadcast Radio Communica-
tions, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 526 (1968).
96. 264 F. Supp. at 41. The KMLA court placed great weight on the FCC's determina-
tion that "Section 605 would be contravened by the unauthorized reception of the FM signal
only when such signal is being transmitted only for reception by the special interests of the
industrial, mercantile, transportation, or other subscribers without any intention of reception
by the general public." Id (quoting 11 Pike & Fischer, R.R. 1599).
97. 264 F. Supp. at 41. Describing multiplex transmissions, the KMLA court stated:
The nature of FM multiplex transmissions negates any intention that they be
received by the public. Multiplex transmissions cannot be received on conventional
FM sets, since they are disseminated not over the main broadcast channel but over a
subcarrier frequency that can be received only with special equipment not part of the
ordinary radio receiving set. Multiplex operations are specifically geared to the spe-
cial requirements of commercial institutions, industrial plants, retail shops, and other
subscribers equipped with this special FM receiving apparatus. Fundamentally,
then, multiplexing is a point-to-point communication service, directed to subscribers
at specified locations.
264 F. Supp. at 42.
reception violated section 605.98
Case law subsequent to KML4 diverges into two lines of rea-
soning. A minority of courts continues to view the broadcasting ver-
sus point-to-point dichotomy dispositive of whether a transmission
either falls within the section 605 exemption or is a protected trans-
mission. Orth-C- Vision, Inc. v. Home Box Office99 employed this ra-
tionale to determine whether section 605 protected HBO's MDS
transmissions. Noting that the FCC classified STV as broadcast-
ing, °° the court declared that there was "little to distinguish HBO's
MDS transmissions from those of the STV systems. '' 0° Therefore,
because the MDS transmissions were "intended to appeal to a mass
audience,"' 2 the court considered MDS as broadcasting, and not as
point-to-point communications. 0 3  Consequently, the prohibitions
of section 605 against interception did not apply to MDS.10 In Na-
tional Subscription Television v. S&H TV, the District Court of the
Central District of California reaffirmed the principle that classifying
a transmission as section 153 broadcasting disposed of the section
605 protection." In so holding, the court adopted the FCC determi-
98. Id The KMIA. court further held that plaintiffs have a private cause of action for
violation of section 605. Id at 43. See supra note 80.
99. 474 F. Supp. 672 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). The dispute in Orih-0- Vision, Inc. Y. Home Box
Office arose when Orth-O-Vision breached its affiliation contract with HBO, but continued to
provide HBO's MDS transmissions to Orth-O-Vision subscribers. HBO could prevent Orth-
O-Vision's continued retransmission of HBO's MDS signals only by completely terminating
HBO's MDS regional system. Because HBO provided the MDS service to other regional affili-
ates, this option was not viable. Consequently, HBO sought injunctive relief against Orth-O-
Vision based on the Communications Act of 1934, the Copyright Act of 1976, and state theft of
service legislation. The court based its award of injunctive relief on the copyright claim, thus
the commentary on the Communications Act is dictum.
100. The Orth-O- Vision court found that STV was broadcasting based on the FCC deci-
sion in Amendment of Part 73, 3 F.C.C.2d 1 (1966).
101. 474 F. Supp. at 682. The court found MDS and STV similar because:
Both media involve the transmission of radio communications that members of the
general public cannot receive without the installation of special equipment for a fee.
More significantly, HBO's programming, consisting of recent movies, sports events
and variety shows, differs little from conventional broadcast fare and is obviously
intended to appeal to a mass audience.
Id
102. Id
103. When the parties argued Orih-O- Vision, the FCC had not determined the character
of MDS transmissions. HBO relied instead on FCC decisions which recognized that the pri-
mary use of MDS was to "provide commercial and industrial subscribers with reception of
specialized communications .. " 474 F. Supp. at 682 n. 10 (citing In re Applications of Mid-
west Corp., 53 F.C.C.2d 294, 300 (1975)). While the Orth-O- Vision court accepted the FCC's
finding, the court noted that these rulings did not "preclude a finding that an MDS system
utilized to provide pay television programming of general appeal and marketed to large num-
bers of non-commercial viewers engages in broadcasting." 474 F. Supp. at 682 n.10.
104. In Orth-O- Vision, the plaintiff, HBO, relied primarily on KMLA in arguing that sec-
tion 605 should protect MDS transmissions. The Orlh-C- Vision court distinguished KMLA by
noting that KMLA sold transmissions only to industrial and mercantile subscribers and, there-
fore, the transmissions did not constitute broadcasting. 474 F. Supp. at 682 n.9.
105. Slip op. (C.D. Ca. 1980), rev'd, 644 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1981). In NST, the plaintiff
sought an injunction against a seller of unauthorized STV decoders.
106. Holding that the classification of a transmission as broadcasting resolved the section
605 question, the NST court stated:
nation that STV is broadcasting and found that the FCC "clearly
implied that subscription TV would be exempt from the prohibition
of Section 605. .. ,7
The majority of courts employ a different approach. In 1979,
the FCC issued a public notice stating that unauthorized reception of
MDS transmissions violated section 605. The FCC based this ruling
on its determination that MDS transmissions did not constitute
broadcasting and were not intended for reception by the general
public. 108 Subsequently, in Home Box Office, Inc. v. Pay TV of
Greater New York, Inc. 1o the court held that interception of MDS
transmissions violated section 605. Although the HBO v. Pay TV
court recognized the FCC determination regarding MDS transmis-
sions, the court limited its analysis of the section 605 violation be-
cause the defendants did not contest the section 605 charge." 0
Despite the FCC's conclusion that MDS transmissions do not
constitute broadcasting, the Commission has not officially reversed
its determinations that STY is broadcasting and that section 605 pro-
tection does not apply to STV transmissions." ' I Nevertheless, a foot-
note in the legal appendix to a FCC staff report" m2 has created a new
case law trend. The authors of the footnote found "no distinguishing
factor that would justify the exclusion of STY programming, but not
the subscription programming transmitted by [MDS], from the pro-
[Bjroadcasting is defined as the dissemination of radio communications intended to
be received by the public. Numerous authorities have distinguished such broadcasts
from point-to-point transmissions or other transmissions not intended to be received
by or for the use of the public and therefore, not within the [section 605] exception.
We find no distinction in the use of the phrase "general public" in one text and "the
public" in the other.
Plaintiffs' arguments that their signals are not intended to be received by the
public and are therefore not broadcast under the exception to Section 605 are unper-
suasive. The crucial consideration is whether the programming is of interest to a
large segment of the population. Program specialization or control are not necessar-
ily determinative of the requisite intent nor dispositive of broadcasting status.
ld (citing Functional Music, Orth-0- Vision, and KML4) (emphasis added).
107. NST slip op. at 6. See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
108. Unauthorized Interception and Use of Multipoint Distribution Service (MDS)
Transmissions, FCC Public Notice, January 24, 1979. The FCC, in determining that MDS
was not broadcasting, found that:
Because material transmitted over (MDS) stations is not intended to be "broad-
cast" material within the meaning of Section 605, authority for its reception and use
must be given by the sender. Therefore, persons will be in violation of the law if they
divulge, publish, or use for their own benefit any MDS communications which they
were not authorized to receive.
Id at 2.
109. 467 F. Supp. 525 (E.D.N.Y. 1979). In HBO v. Pay TV, a contract dispute arose
between HBO and an affiliate who received HBO programming via MDS. HBO sought to
enjoin the affiliate from intercepting and selling HBO programming in areas not contemplated
by the affiliation contract.
110. NST slip op. at 4 n.2. The defendants in HBO v. Pay TV argued that because HBO
consented to the defendant's continued interception of HBO programming, the doctrine of
laches applied to bar injunctive relief. 467 F. Supp. at 528.
111. See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
112. FCC STAFF REPORT supra note 2, at 126 n.17.
tection afforded by Section 605."''13 At this point, the courts first
began to recognize that the section 605 exemption language contains
two requirements. To gain exemption from section 605 protections,
a transmission must be defined as broadcasting and be transmitted
for the use of the general public. Thus, the test shifts from the ques-
tion whether the transmission is of interest to the general public, as
posited by the minority, to whether the transmission is of interest to
the general public and is intended for the use of the general
public." 1
4
The court in Chartwell Communications Group ,. Westbrook"
5
adopted this reasoning in holding that section 605 protects STV.
The court stated that "there is an important distinction between
making a service available to the general public and intending a pro-
gram for the use of the general public. . . .Availability and use are
separate concepts."' "16 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
in National Subscription Television v. S&H TV ' 7 concluded that sec-
tion 153 does not control the reach of the section 605 exemption."1'
8
Accordingly, the court found the sales of unauthorized reception de-
vices illegal.
The majority's reasoning, which requires satisfying two ele-
ments instead of one to gain exemption from section 605 protections,
provides a narrower interpretation of the exemption's scope. Thus,
this recent trend expands the types of communications protected
against interception by section 605. This expansion of protection
may be based on economic necessities: in light of technological ad-
vances that decrease the price of interception devices, protection of
pay television becomes more urgent. Affording MDS and STV pro-
tection under section 605 responds to this urgency. As noted in
Chartwell, STV operators cannot function effectively unless they can
restrict the viewing audience to paying subscribers.' t9
The most recent decision examining the section 605 exemption,
Home Box Office v. Advanced Consumer Technology, 120 reaffirmed
113. Id
114. On appeal, the defendants in NST v. S&H TV, 644 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1981), claimed
that requiring an additional element to gain the section 605 exemption was redundant. Thus,
defendants urged that because a statute should be construed to avoid redundancy, the court's
construction was incorrect. The appellate court did not find this argument persuasive. Id at
825.
115. 637 F.2d 459 (6th Cir. 1980). In Chartwell, the defendants sold equipment that could
receive and unscramble STV signals. Plaintiffs sought to enjoin this activity under section 605.
116. Id at 465.
117. 644 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1981).
118. In reversing the district court's finding, the court of appeals stated: "We think that an
individual might 'broadcast'-i.e., transmit a signal over the airwaves with the intent that it be
received by the public within the meaning of Section 153(o)-without such broadcasting being
for the use of the public within the meaning" of the exemption. 644 F.2d at 824.
119. 637 F.2d at 465.
120. Slip op. (S.D.N.Y., Nov. 6, 1981). In HBO Y. ACT spra note 32, at -, HBO
decisions that reject focusing on the broadcast versus point-to-point
dichotomy alone. The court found support for the current majority
reasoning in the legislative history of section 605.121 Despite the
emergence of this majority, however, the FCC still recognizes that
classifying a transmission as broadcasting impacts other provisions
of the 1934 Communications Act. 22 In 1980, United States Repre-
sentative Preyer introduced legislation1 23 aimed at ending the STV-
Section 605 controversy by providing penalties of up to one million
dollars for an unauthorized interception of subscription telecommu-
nications. Congress never passed this legislation.
t24
Importantly, application of section 605 prohibitions requires a
two-step analysis. A violation of section 605 occurs only when:
(1) the specific transmission finds protection under section 605; and
(2) the intercepted transmission is divulged, published, or used for
benefit.125 While the mere monitoring of a protected signal may not
violate section 605,126 the monitoring of an entertainment signal nor-
mally available only as a pay service does benefit the viewer and,
consequently, violates section 605.127 The final case study will apply
this analysis of section 605 protections to reception of pay television
signals by a private TVRO owner.
B. CopyrightAct of1976
The Copyright Act of 1976128 also applies to programming in-
terception because most programming transmitted for television re-
ception is copyrighted. Congress enacted the 1976 Act to remedy
deficiencies in the 1909 Copyright Act.' 29 These deficiencies became
brought suit against the manufacturer and seller of devices capable of intercepting HBO's
MDS transmissions and obtained an injunction against the sale of these devices. Although the
HBO court also noted that ACT manufactured TVROs, the court did not rule on the legality
of TVROs.
121. Id.; see supra notes 66 and 68.
122. A recent FCC Staff Report on DBS discussed the following issue: "[Wihether the
contemplated satellite offerings may be differentiated from the concept of a 'broadcasting'
service as denied in the [1934] Act, so as to permit the Commission to exempt these services
from statutory or other provisions generally applicable to radio broadcasting." FCC STAFF
REPORT, supra note 2, at 116.
123. H.R. 7747, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG. REC. H6120-21 (daily ed. July 2, 1980)
(Comments of Preyer).
124. The House referred H.R. 7747 to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce. 126 CONG. REC. INDEx 7 (1980). The bill never left the committee.
125. 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1970).
126. See Letter from Robert Bruce, General Counsel, FCC, to Kenan Heise, Action Line
Editor, Chicago Tribune, Feb. 23, 1981, (merely monitoring police transmissions is not a viola-
tion of section 605 even though police transmissions are point-to-point communications pro-
tected by section 605) reprinted in Letter from Stephen A. Sharp, General Counsel, FCC, to
Honorable John D. Dingell, Chairman, Committee on Energy and Commerce, U.S. House of
Representatives, Dec. 17, 1981 [hereinafter cited as FCC Opinion Letter] Attachment E.
127. See, e.g., NST v. S&H TV, 644 F.2d 820, 826 (9th Cir. 1981); Chartwell Communica-
tions Group v. Westbrook, 637 F.2d 459, 466 (6th Cir.1980).
128. 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-810 (1977).
129. Pub. L. No. 349, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909).
apparent in 1968 when the United States Supreme Court, interpret-
ing the 1909 Act, held that a cable company's retransmission of a
copyrighted work was not a performance subject to copyright in-
fringement. 30 Similarly, the Court held reception and playing of a
copyrighted work in a public place without charge was not an in-
fringement.' 3' Concurrent with these decisions, the FCC promul-
gated regulations regarding cable television's retransmission of
television signals without addressing the copyright implications.
32
Congress drafted the 1976 Act to clarify these retransmission ambi-
guities. 33 Notably, the Act requires cable systems that retransmit
copyrighted material to pay royalty fees. Upon payment, the system
receives a compulsory license. While the copyright owner receives
greater protection under the 1976 Act, the owner cannot control who
retransmits his material.
34
Two sections of the 1976 Act are germane to this analysis. Sec-
tion 106 31 outlines the features that constitute a copyright and
grants the copyright owner the exclusive right to either perform
copyrighted work publicly 36 or to authorize such public perform-
ance. 37 The broader definition of performance under the 1976 Act
130. Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968). The Court
ruled that: "Broadcasters perform. Viewers do not perform .... When CATV is considered
in this framework, we conclude that it falls on the viewer's side of the line." Id at 398-99
(footnotes omitted). See also Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 415
U.S. 394 (1974) (distance from original broadcast does not alter nonperformance status). One
commentator criticizes the reasoning in these decisions as an oversimplification of cable televi-
sion functions. Greene, The Cable Televirion Provisions of the Revised Copyright Act, 27 CATH.
U. L. REV. 263 (1978).
131. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151 (1975). In Aiken, defendant
turned on a radio in his restaurant and allowed the radio to play throughout the business day.
See Comment, Copyright.- Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Alien-Infringement Liability of a
Restaurant Ownerfor Reception of Radio Broadcast/or the Enjoyment of His Customers, 30
OKLA. L. REV. 201 (1977); Note, Copyright-Infringement, Public Performancefor Profit-Ra-
dio Reception as Performance, 14 DUQ. L. REV. 739 (1976).
132. 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.51-.57 (1981). See Greene, The Cable Television Provisions, supra
note 130, at 272-79.
133. See H. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659; Greene, supra note 130. For a discussion of the Copyright Act of
1976 and its impact on cable television, see generally Besen, Manning & Mitchell, Copyright
Liablity For Cable Television. Compulsory Licensing and the Coase Theorem, 21 J.L. AND
ECON. 67 (1978); Botein, The New Copyright Act and Cable Television-A Signal of Change, 24
BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 1 (1976); Brotman, Cable Television and Copyright- Legislation and
the Marketplace Model, 2 CoMM/ENT 477 (1980); Kachigian, The New Copyright Law and
Cable Television, Interpretation andlImplications, 7 PERF. ARTS REV. 176 (1977); Oler, Legislat-
ing Copyright Protection For Works Used in Public Broadcasting, 25 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y
118 (1977); Simon, Local Television Versus Cable. A Copyright Theory of Protection, 31 F.
COM. L.J. 51 (1978).
134. See Greene, supra note 130.
135. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106 (1977).
136. Section 101 of the Copyright Act of 1976 provides that public performance of a work
means performance "at a place open to the public or any place where a substantial number of
persons outside of a normal circle of family" may view the work. 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (1977).
137. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106(4) (1977). The pertinent part of section 106 provides:
includes a transmission."13 Section 1111 39 deals with cable television
systems and divides retransmission into three categories. The first,
category describes secondary transmissions exempted from copyright
infringement. This group includes MATVs and SMATVs' 4 ° that re-
lay signals to private lodgings in multi-unit dwellings provided no
direct charge is made. 4 ' The third category deals with secondary
transmissions by a cable system. This classification extends a com-
pulsory license to cable systems if the system pays a royalty fee, and
provided that the FCC regulations or authorization permit the sec-
ondary transmissions carried."42 Notwithstanding the provisions of
the first and third categories, the second category provides that full
copyright liability will apply to a secondary transmission made to
the public "if the primary transmission is not made for reception by
the public at large but is controlled and limited to reception by par-
Subject to Sections 107 through 118, the owner of copyright under this title has
the exclusive right to do and to authorize any of the following:
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copy-
righted work publicly;
Id
138. See H. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWs 5659, 5676-77. Sections 107-18 of the 1976 Copyright Act provide limita-
tions on a copyright. Two sections are notable. Section 107 excludes "fair use" from copyright
infringement. 17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (1977). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals overturned a
recent attempt to apply the fair use exception to home video recording in the celebrated
Betamax case, Universal City Studios v. Sony Corporation of America, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir.
1981). The decision instantly created a new class of criminals from owners of home video
recording equipment. Section 110(5) exempts from copyright infringement the reception of a
transmission of copyrighted material by a common private-home-type receiving device, pro-
vided there is no direct charge for viewing the transmission and no retransmission to the pub-
lic. 17 U.S.C.A. § 110(5) (1977). Whether Congress and the courts consider a TVRO to be a
common reception device is unclear.
139. 17 U.S.C.A. § 111 (1977).
140. See supra note 45.
141. 17 U.S.C.A. § Ill(a)(l) (1977).
142. 17 U.S.C.A. § 1 I(c) (1977). Section I 1 I(f) of the 1976 Copyright Act provides some
relevant definitions:
A "primary transmission" is a transmission made to the public by the transmit-
ting facility whose signals are being received and further transmitted by the secon-
dary transmission service, regardless of where or when the performance or display
was first transmitted.
A "secondary transmission" is the further transmitting of a primary transmission
simultaneously with the primary transmission, or nonsimultaneously with the pri-
mary transmission if by a "cable system"....
A "cable system" is a facility ... that in whole or in part receives signals trans-
mitted or programs broadcast by one or more television broadcast stations licensed
by the Federal Communications Commission, and makes secondary transmissions of
such signals or programs, by wires, cables, or other communications channels to sub-
scribing members of the public who pay for such service.
17 U.S.C.A. § I 1 (f) (1977). These definitions do not make clear whether a TVRO used as an
SMATV and operated for a direct charge must comply with cable television royalty require-
ments. Because SMATV would serve the same function as a cable system and because the
definition of cable system is very broad, one commentator suggests that SMATV may fall
under the cable system provisions. Neitert, Earth Stations.- Are They Legal, Society for Pri-
vate and Commercial Earth Stations Newsletter 9, August 1981.
ticular members of the public. . ... " "4 The legislative history of the
1976 Act supports the application of this provision to pay
television. I"
The 1976 Act provides several remedies for copyright 'infringe-
ment. These remedies include injunctions, 45 impoundment and dis-
position of infringing articles, 46 damage and profits or statutory
damages, 147 costs and attorney's fees,'
48 and criminal penalties. 149
This remedial section formed the basis for relief in Orth-0- Vision, 150
the only case to consider the copyright protection of pay television.
In Orth-O- Vision, HBO sought a permanent injunction against the
unauthorized marketing of HBO's pay service. The court granted a
permanent injunction that extended to "any future infringement of
HBO's shows not yet published or copyrighted."'' However, the
court did not determine whether those receiving and privately view-
ing the pay service violated the Copyright Act. This public-private
distinction will be further noted in the TVRO case analysis.'52
C. Other Protections
1. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. -The
FCC has suggested that because the 1968 Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act 53 makes mere interception of protected com-
munications a crime, the Act also creates a civil cause of action for
interception of satellite signals.' 54 Following this line of reasoning,
the FCC contends that the Omnibus Act protects any pay television
signal sent via satellite. This interpretation is highly attenuated since
the Act only protects wire and oral communications against intercep-
tion; neither satellite signals nor over-the-air technologies like STV
qualify as a wire or oral communication. 55 Pay cable, on the other
143. 17 U.S.C.A. § Ill(b) (1977).
144. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 138, at 5707.
145. 17 U.S.C.A. § 502 (1977).
146. 17 U.S.C.A. § 503 (1977).
147. 17 U.S.C.A. § 504 (1977).
148. 17 U.S.C.A. § 505 (1977).
149. 17 U.S.C.A. § 506 (1977).
150. See supra notes 99-104 and accompanying text.
151. 474 F. Supp. at 685. The Orth-O- Vision court rejected an argument that an injunc-
tion should extend only to copyrighted works already transmitted. The court felt that such a
limitation would cause a new action each time defendant transmitted a new copyrighted pro-
gram. Such actions would result in an inefficacious multiplicity of suits. Id at 686.
152. See infra notes 159-76 and accompanying text.
153. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1976).
154. Regulation of Domestic Receive-Only Satellite Earth Stations, 74 F.C.C.2d 205, 216
(1979).
155. Section 2510 of the Omnibus Act provides the following definitions:
(1) "wire communication" means any communication made in whole or in
part through the use of facilities for the transmission of communications by the aid of
wire, cable, or other like connection between the point of origin and the point of re-
ception ... .
(2) "oral communication" means any oral communication uttered by a person
hand, may qualify as a wire communication providing both criminal
penalties and a civil right of action for interception of protected com-
munications. Thus, contrary to the FCC's position, the Omnibus Act
may protect only pay cable, not over-the-air systems.
2 State Theft of Service Statutes. -Because pay television sys-
tems provide a service in return for a fee, unauthorized interception
of pay television signals may violate state theft of service statutes.
All states have enacted laws prohibitingtheft of services, but the
form and applicability of these statutes vary. 56 Typically, theft of
exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception
under circumstances justifying such expectation;
18 U.S.C. § 2510 (1976) (emphasis added). Because a signal transmitted over the air or via
satellite does not need a wire or cable, the communication does not qualify under the first
definition. Similarly, because a television signal normally is not considered an utterance, the
transmission probably would not qualify under the second definition. Nevertheless, assuming
that the oral communication definition applied to an over-the-air signal, a sender seeking pro-
tection from interception still would need to show a justifiable expectation of privacy. United
States v. Carroll, 337 F. Supp. 1260 (D.C. 1971). A pay programming originator who beams
his service to most of the continental United States via satellite probably will have difficulty
demonstrating a justifiable expectation of privacy.
156. While all fifty states have enacted some form of theft of service law, only twenty-four
states expressly prohibit theft of cable television services. These states include: Arizona, ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3709 (Supp. 1981); California, CAL. PENAL CODE § 593d (Deering
Supp. 1981); Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-118 (West Supp. 1981); Florida,
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 812.14 (West Supp. 1982); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 104-9902 (Supp.
1981); Hawaii, HAWAII REV. STAT. § 275-9 (Supp. 1975); Illinois, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 16-
10 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982); Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. § 35-43-5-3(6) (Burns 1979); Kansas,
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3752 (Supp. 1980); Massachusetts, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 166A
§ 21 (West 1976); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.52 (West Supp. 1981); Missouri, Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 570.010 (Vernon 1979); Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-6-306 (1981); Ne-
vada, NEV. REV. STAT. § 205.470 (1979); New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48:5A-52 (West Supp.
1981); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 63-10-1 (1978); New York, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 165.15
(McKinney Supp. 1981); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-118.5 (1981); Ohio, OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 4933.42 (Page Supp. 1981); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1737
(West Supp. 1981); South Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 22-1-2 (41), 22-30A-8 (1979);
Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. § 7-59-108 (1980); Virginia, VA. CODE § 18.2-165.1 (Supp.
1981); Washington, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.45.250 (1977).
Other state theft of service laws may apply to cable television interceptions, but make no
explicit reference to cable television services. The following states explicitly refer to telecom-
munications service: Colorado, CoLo. REV. STAT. § 18-9-309 (1978); Idaho, IDAHO CODE
§ 18-6713 (Supp. 1981); Maryland, MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 340-42 (1980); Michigan,
MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.540(c) (1972); Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-515 (1979);
Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-35-16 (1969); South Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-13-
400 (Law. Co-op. 1977); Texas, TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.04 (Vernon Supp. 1981); Wiscon-
sin, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 943.45 (West Supp. 1981); Wyoming, WYO. STAT. § 37-12-123 (1977).
Remaining states with theft of service statutes include: Alabama, ALA. CODE § 13A-8-10
(1975); Alaska, ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.200 (1978); Arkansas, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-2204
(1977); Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 845 (1979); Iowa, IowA CODE ANN. § 714.1 (West
1979); Kentucky, Ky. REV. STAT. § 514.060 (1978); Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14.67.6
(Supp. 1982); Maine, ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 357 (1981); Mississippi, Miss. CODE
ANN. § 97-25-1 (Supp. 1981); New Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 637:8 (1974); North
Dakota; N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-03 (1976); Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. § 164.125 (1979);
Pennsylvania, 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3926 (1981); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-409 (1953);
Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2585 (Supp. 1981); West Virginia, W. VA. CODE §§ 61-3-
44, 61-3-45 (1977).
The number of theft of service laws containing explicit references to cable television has
grown because of the uncertain nature of federal protections for pay television. See Lewis
Letter, supra note 5. In addition, New Hampshire has enacted a new type of statute. The New
services is defined as to an intent to avoid payment and applies both
to the person avoiding the payment and to anyone aiding such
avoidance, such as sellers of interception devices. Only the Orth-0-
Vision court has considered a theft of service statute as applied to
pay television. In that case, the court noted that the federal Copy-
right Act of 1976 did not preempt a state theft of service claim be-
cause the theft claim involved "an element which is not part of a
cause of action for copyright infringement-the intent to avoid pay-
ment."' 5 7 This reasoning applies equally well to claims that section
605 preempts state theft of service laws. t58
V. A Case Analysis: Privately Owned TVROs
As previously demonstrated, existing yet unclear legal protec-
tions for pay television programming often prove inadequate. These
protections become more untenable when applied to the growing
problem of pay television interception by owners of backyard earth
stations. The following hypothetical demonstrates this problem.
A. The Case
H, a homeowner, has purchased and installed in his backyard a
TVRO manufactured by M. By pointing the TVRO skyward H re-
ceives a wide assortment of programming transmitted via satellite,
including 0, XO, and FO programming. The originators of 0, XO,
and FO hold copyrights in the transmitted material. FO provides
free religious programming to viewers who have permission from
FO. H has permission. O's and XO's programming is distributed as
pay cable. D, a basic cable company, serves H's area. D also
purchased a TVRO manufactured by M and distributes O's pro-
gramming as a pay cable service. An affiliation agreement between
D and 0 makes D's distribution of O's programming legitimate. D
has decided not to provide XO programming as a pay cable service
because D perceives XO's programming as too "racy" for his com-
munity. Also, D does not provide FO programming.1 59 Because H
Hampshire statute prohibits the sale of fraudulent communication paraphernalia, including
cable television decoders. This statute is in addition to, not in lieu of, traditional theft of
service statutes. See N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 638:5-a (Supp. 1.981). See also Lewis Letter
supra note 5.
157. 474 F. Supp. at 684. The Orth-O- Vision court denied a motion for summary judg-
ment on the theft of service claim because a factual question existed on whether the defendant
intended to avoid, or merely to defer, payment.
158. State prohibitions against unfair competition may provide an alternate theory of re-
covery for interception of pay television. Unfair competition is an "interference and diversion
of profit at the point where plaintiff's profit is to be made." KMLA Broadcasting Corp. v.
Twentieth Century Cigarette Vendors Corp., 264 F. Supp. 35, 44 (C.D. Ca. 1967). Neverthe-
less, because both an unfair competition claim and a copyright claim depend on the right to
public performance, the Orth-O-Vision court ruled that the Copyright Act of 1976 preempts
state claims grounded in unfair competition. 474 F. Supp. at 683.
159. If only D has the capability of providing pay television services, he may exercise his
has access to a wide variety of programming, H does not subscribe to
D's pay cable service or basic cable service. H has offered to pay 0
and XO for their services but 0 and XO have refused, preferring to
be distributed through a cable system.
B. Rights and Liabilities
1. State Theft of Service Statutes. -A theft of service violation
requires an intent to avoid payment and applies both to the individ-
ual avoiding payment and to anyone who aids such avoidance. 6 '
Accordingly, 0, XO and D may seek prosecution of both H and M
under the theft of service statute. These charges, however, will prob-
ably fail. Because M's TVROs have many legitimate uses, including
reception of an authorized signal, such as FO, and distribution of
D's pay cable programming, the sale of TVROs by M does not vio-
late state theft of service laws. Thus, theft of service charges may be
lodged against the maker and seller of devices only useful for inter-
ception of pay signals while the TVRO's broader capability insulates
M from liability. Similarly, it will be difficult to prove H intended to
avoid payment since H can put his TVRO to legitimate uses, includ-
ing viewing FO programming which he cannot receive from D's
cable service. Furthermore, H's offer to pay 0 and XO severely
hampers a charge that H intended to avoid payment.
2. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. -Since
H's reception of a satellite signal does not involve interception of
either a wire or oral communication protected by the Omnibus
Act, 6 ' the Act's prohibitions do not apply.
3. Copyright Act of 1976.-Because the originators copy-
righted 0 and XO programming, a possible cause of action exists
under the Copyright Act of 1976.162 One of the exclusive rights
granted a copyright holder is the right of public performance of the
copyrighted material.' 63 While a retransmission of copyrighted ma-
terial clearly constitutes a performance,'" it is not clear if reception
of a signal by H's TVRO and an ensuing conversion of that signal to
a form acceptable by H's television set constitutes a retransmission.
The Act, nevertheless, considers a cable television system a retrans-
discretion as, in effect, a community censor. The wide-ranging social and political implica-
tions of this behavior are beyond the scope of this comment.
160. See supra notes 156-67 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 153-55 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 128, 133-52 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
164. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
mitter 65 falling within copyright provisions. Because of the identity
of functions of a cable system and H's TVRO-to-home-television
system, H's system might qualify as a retransmitter.t66 This interpre-
tation follows from the Act's purpose to include a wide variety of
retransmissions within the statute's protections.1 67 The Act specifi-
cally excludes certain retransmissions from copyright infringe-
ment,' 68  but provides that these exceptions do not apply to
retransmissions of pay television programming.' 69 Thus, copyright
protections should apply to H's reception and conversion of 0 and
XO programming. A copyright holder, however, receives only the
exclusive right to publicly perform copyrighted material. 70 There-
fore, program viewing limited to H's family and a normal circle of
friends in the privacy of H's home precludes finding a violation of
the Copyright Act.'
7'
4. Section 605 of the Communications Act. -Section 605 of the
Communications Act provides the major threat to H's continued re-
ception of 0 and XO signals. The threshold determination is
whether section 605 protects the satellite transmission of a pay televi-
sion service or whether such transmission falls within the exemption
from protection.
The FCC classifies certain satellite transmissions as nonbroad-
cast for section 605 purposes.' 72 Using this determination as a start-
ing point, several possibilities require examination. Under the
minority case law, section 605 protection depends on whether the
communication is point-to-point or broadcasting. If the communica-
tion is broadcasting, it falls within the exemption from section 605
165. See H. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659, 5677.
166. See Neitert, Earth Stations. Are They Legal, Society for Private Commercial Earth
Stations Newsletter 9, August 198 1. While a home TVRO system and a cable system function
similarly, a home TVRO does not fall under the Copyright Act's definition of cable system.
See supra note 142. Thus, a home TVRO operator would not need to pay royalty fees or to
obtain a compulsory license. Neitert at 11.
167. See H. REP. No. 1476, U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5677.
168. See supra notes 141.42 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 143-44 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 135-37 and accompanying text.
171. See Neitert, Earth Stations, note 166 supra Section 111 retains the requirement that
the secondary transmission be made "to the public" in order for pay television protections to
attach. 17 U.S.C.A. § 111(b) (West 1977). Furthermore, while full copyright liability may
apply to public retransmissions of pay television, see supra note 143 and accompanying text,
rights granted to a copyright holder limit this liability. Thus, no copyright infringement occurs
unless one not authorized to do so by the copyright holder performs. See supra notes 136-37
and accompanying text. But see Perle, Is the Bird Pie in the Sky?-Communications Satellites
and the Law, 27 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'y 325, 333 (1979). ("[T]he pickup of a pay signal by
anyone, from any source ... and the retransmission of that signal would be a copyright in-
fringement." This analysis, however, did not examine the public versus private viewing
distinction.)
172. Unauthorized Interception and Use of Satellite Transmissions, FCC Public Notice
No. 7999, Oct. 3, 1978.
protections. 7 3 Thus, if courts using minority reasoning defer to the
FCC's classification, section 605's prohibitions against interception
apply to 0 and XO programming. Conversely, if courts using mi-
nority reasoning reject the FCC's nonbroadcast classification and
characterize the satellite transmissions as broadcasting, the section
605 exemption would apply. Under majority case law, section 605
protections are denied only when the communication is both broad-
casting and intended for the use of the general public.'74 Thus,
courts using majority reasoning and deferring to the FCC's conclu-
sion would apply section 605 protection to 0 and XO. Similarly,
courts using majority reasoning, but rejecting the FCC's nonbroad-
cast classification, also would apply section 605 protection if the pro-
gramming were not intended for the use of the general public. In
sum, three of the four possible interpretations might attach section
605 protection to 0 and XO programming.
Even if section 605 protections attach, a second question arises
on whether the interception by H constituted a violation of section
605. A violation through interception only occurs if the interceptor
divulges, publishes, or benefits from, the interception. 75 Under the
current trend, if the signal involves an entertainment service pro-
vided for a fee, interception and viewing the signal constitutes a ben-
efit and a violation of section 605.176 Under this reasoning, H
violates section 605 by interception and viewing 0 and XO program-
ming. However, FO's permission to H to receive FO programming
creates practical problems in detecting violations.
5. Policy Considerations and the Waxman Bill -Even assum-
ing that H violates the law by viewing 0 or XO programming, a
problem remains in discovering the violation. A TVRO is inherently
different from other available interception devices. Possession of an
unauthorized STV decoder or MDS antenna indicates an unauthor-
ized interception of a particular type of programming; possession of
a TVRO yields no such conclusion. A TVRO has an assortment of
legitimate uses, as H's reception of FO programming demonstrates.
Thus, discovering a violation in a TVRO case requires entry of H's
home while H is viewing a pay signal. Obviously this is impractical.
Recent debate on the Waxman Bill' 7 7 has highlighted the
173. See supra notes 99-107 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 114-18 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
176. Id The broad interpretation that interception and viewing a pay signal violates sec-
tion 605 has created fears that an unintended reception and viewing of a pay signal, caused
while dialing an earth station from free signal to free signal, would constitute a violation. See
Testimony of Brown, supra note 23, at 8.
177. H.R. 4727, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. See Introductory remarks by Hon. Timothy E.
Wirth, 128 CONG. REc. H 7177-78 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1981).
problems involved with privately-owned TVROs. The Waxman Bill
adds specific penalties for violation of section 605,178 but does not
change current language of the section.' 79 Therefore, the Bill does
nothing to resolve the private earth station controversy. 80 Debate
on the Bill, however, has defined the major policy considerations in-
volved with penalizing the private use of TVROs. First, absent
TVROs certain areas may never receive pay television service be-
cause more conventional distributors may find delivery to such areas
economically unfeasible.'81 Second, while most earth station owners
agree that pay television suppliers should be reimbursed for the use
of the pay service, suppliers usually refuse the owners' offer to pay
for the signal.'8 2 Justifiably, earth station owners fear prosecution
under section 605 despite their efforts to pay.' 83 The pay television
industry responds by arguing that a direct-to-originator payment
would disrupt the current distribution scheme and asserts that the
survival of the industry depends on protection.184 Currently, several
pay television originators are considering encoding their satellite
transmissions. This procedure renders the signals unintelligible ab-
sent proper decoding devices.' 85 Encoding would effectively deny
pay service to some areas until the advent of DBS, which is many
years away. One suggested compromise solution to this problem
proposes that signal suppliers receive an additional fee charged at
178. In addition to reaffirming and specifying the availability of injunctive relief, civil
liability, and criminal penalties for violation of section 605, see supra note 80, the Waxman Bill
grants an aggrieved party the option of statutory damages. These damages range from not less
than $100 for an unknowing violation to $50,000 for a knowing violation accomplished for
financial gain. H.R. 4727.
179. Because section 605 protects all point-to-point transmissions, including police trans-
missions, the Waxman Bill's penalties would attach to owners of devices such as police scan-
ners. The FCC has suggested that this result runs contrary to the intention of the bill and that
amendments are in order. See FCC Opinion Letter, supra note 126.
180. Upon introduction of the Waxman Bill, cosponsor Wirth stated: "It is my hope that
this legislation can serve as a vehicle for reaching an agreement between private Earth Station
owners. . . and program producers and distributors. ... 128 CONG. REc. H7177-78 (daily
ed. Oct. 7, 1981). The FCC has suggested specifically exempting earth stations from the pen-
alty provisions. FCC Opinion Letter, supra note 126, at 8-9. Nevertheless, the FCC has also
suggested an explicit inclusion of STV and MDS under these provisions. Id. at 12.
181. See Testimony of Brown, supra note 23, at 3, 9.
182. Id at 9-10. See also Hill Swashbuckles TVPiracy Issue, BROADCASTING 46, Nov. 23,
1981; FCC Opinion Letter supra note 126, at 9 (refusal to deal a "legitimate problem"). The
Society for Private and Commercial Earth Stations (SPACE) suggests that refusal by suppliers
to accept payment from private TVRO owners constitutes an antitrust violation. See Testi-
mony of Brown supra note 23, at 7-10. This contention has been dismissed by the FCC. See
Teleprompter, 87 F.C.C.2d 531, 546-50.
183. See Testimony of Brown, supra note 23, at 8.
184. See Debate Between Rick Brown, General Counsel for SPACE and Fritz Attaway,
Vice President, Motion Picture Association of America, at the Earth Station Convention in
Washington, D.C., April 17-19 (excerpts available in Society for Private and Commercial
Earth Stations Newsletter 3, May 1981).
185. Seentipiracy Move." Scrambling HBO, BROADCASTING 58, Feb. 22, 1982. Although
one court has held that encoding is unnecessary to obtain legal protection for a pay signal,
HBO v. ACT, supra note 32 at -, the FCC suggests that encoding be-pursued. FCC Opinion
Letter, supra note 126, at 5.
the point of sale of a TVRO.186 Alternatively, a TVRO owner could
pay a fee similar to the royalty fee paid by cable systems. 8 7 Both
options would require extensive, additional regulatory structures
that take years to develop. The TVRO controversy is already upon
US.
VI. Conclusions
Few deny that pay television suppliers should be afforded pro-
tection against those who intercept and view pay programming with-
out paying for the service. However, valid policy considerations
arise when a TVRO owner with no other access to pay programming
and willing to pay for the service intercepts. The present state of
available legal protections inadequately protects a pay programming
supplier against a pirate. Currently, an antiquated communications
act and a sievelike network of ancillary legal theories measures con-
duct. Applying this legal structure to the problem presented by a
TVRO owner who has a legitimate interest in receiving high quality
programming but can only accomplish this by intercepting a pay sig-
nal without authorization, results in industry turmoil.
Congress did not formulate the current communications law un-
til the state of communications in America had become chaotic.
l88
Considering the rapid development of communications technology
and the inadequate legal structure, similar chaos may be at hand.
Congress should face this problem directly. Courts are inappropri-
ate arenas for formulating rules that affect the general public. Stop-
gap amendments to an antiquated act only exacerbate the problem.
Meanwhile, TVRO sales continue to grow, pay television services
continue to proliferate, and the FCC's time bomb continues to tick.
SHAUN R. EISENHAUER
186. See Testimony of Brown, supra note 23, at 9.
187. See id; supra note 142 and accompanying text.
188. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
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